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Standing Up for Flast: Taxpayer 
and Citizen Standing to Raise 
Constitutional Issues 
BY DAVIDs. BOGEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Individual citizens and taxpayers have occasionally sued 
the federal government for alleged violations of the Constitu-
tion even though the alleged violation did not deprive the 
plaintiffs of any property or freedom. 1 The thrust of these suits 
has been that the government has violated its obligations to its 
citizens and taxpayers by exceeding constitutional limits. The 
Supreme Court has consistently held that such plaintiffs lack 
standing to sue. 
One exception to this pattern was Flast v. Cohen. 2 In Flast, 
the Court held that taxp~yers had standing to challenge federal 
expenditures which allegedly violated the constitutional prohi-
bition against establishment of religion. The Court based its 
holding on a finding that such taxpayers had a "personal 
stake" unlike that of citizens or taxpayers in other non-injury 
suits. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has purported 
to distinguish Flast or has displayed hostility toward it.3 The 
present position of the Court on the standing of citizens or 
taxpayers to raise constitutional issues is uncertain.4 This arti-
cle examines the bases for expanding or limiting such standing 
and proffers a rationale for the Court's decision in Flast v. 
Cohen. 
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. B.A. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Harvard; 
LL.M. 1967, New York University. 
1 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); 
Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
z 392 u.s. 83 (1968). 
~ See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In Richardson, Justice Powell said, 
"I •.. would lay rest to the approach undertaken in Flast." I d. at 180. 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In Richardson, 
Justices Marshall, Stewart, Brennan, and Douglas disagreed with the plurality's use 
of Flast to deny standing. Id. at 185-207. 
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I. FLAST V. COHEN: THE CASE IN CONTROVERSY 
In Flast v. Cohen, 5 taxpayers claimed that federal expendi-
tures made to finance instruction and to purchase textbooks 
and other materials in parochial schools violated the establish-
ment and free exercise of religion clause of the first amend-
ment. The three-judge lower court held that the taxpayers 
lacked standing.6 
The Supreme Court noted that the question of standing 
concerns whether the party bringing suit is a proper party, not 
the justiciability of a particular issue.7 At a minimum, the case 
and controversy limitation on federal court jurisdictions re-
quires that the parties be adverse so they will raise and thor-
oughly argue opposing views. This adversity must be the prod-
uct of something more than the mere fact that the parties are 
on opposing sides. 
The 'gist of the question of standing' is whether the party 
seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which 
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult con-
stitutional questions. '9 
In Flast, the Court found the requisite "personal stake" be-
cause the plaintiffs satisfied a two-nexus test: 
The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to 
it. First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between 
that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked. 
Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconsti-
tutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the 
taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution. 
It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of 
tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory 
statute .... Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus 
between that status and the precise nature of the constitu-
tional infringement alleged. Under this requirement, the tax-
5 392 u.s. 83 (1968). 
• Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The expenditures had been 
made under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 
1 392 U.S. at 99-100. 
8 U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2, cl. 1. 
' 392 U.S. at 99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
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payer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds spe-
cific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of 
the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply 
that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated 
to Congress by Art. I, § 8.10 
149 
Justice Harlan contended that the Court's criteria did not 
demonstrate a "personal stake." There was no suggestion that 
any tax was improperly levied or that the challenged expendi-
ture affected the taxpayer's tax burden. If the government did 
not spend the money for the challenged purpose, it would have 
spent it for another purpose or incurred a smaller deficit. The 
taxpayer did not and could not request a return of funds. The 
only connections taxpayers qua taxpayers have to the govern-
ment are that they are within its sovereign power (as citizens, 
residents, or persons owning or receiving assets within the terri-
tory of the taxing power), and have, through a tax, paid the 
government money that has become part of a general fund 
which is used to pay governmental expenditures. 11 
Although Justice Harlan argued that taxpayers should not 
have standing in the Flast situation, 12 he agreed that the 
taxpayer seeking to stop allegedly unconstitutional action by 
his government is sufficiently adverse to present a "case" or 
"controversy" within the meaning of Article ill. 13 However, 
since the taxpayer is "non-Hohfeldian,"14 the relief requested 
II [d. at 102-03. 
n Id. at 116-19. 
The relief available to such a plaintiff consists entirely of the vindication of 
rights held in common by all citizens . . . . [T]he United States holds its 
general funds, not as stockholder or trustee for those who have paid its 
imposts, but as surrogate for the population at large. 
Id. at 118-19 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
•z Id. at 116 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
11 ld. at 130, 131 n.21 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
•• Justice Harlan stated: 
I have here employed the phrases "Hohfeldian" and "non-Hohfeldian" 
plaintiffs to mark the distinction between the personal and proprietary inter-
ests of the traditional plaintiff, and the representative and public interests 
of the plaintiff in a public action. 
Id. at 119 n.5. 
The "non-Hohfeldian" plaintiff seeks "vindication of rights held in common by 
all citizens"; he cannot ask for damages. Rather, he invokes the court's power to order 
particular behavior by government officials. Such orders are equitable in nature and 
the courts in such cases have traditionally considered whether under all the circum-
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is equitable in nature and the Court has power to determine 
whether such relief should be granted. Justice Harlan con-
cluded that unless such plaintiffs were given standing by Con-
gress, the likelihood of a substantial increase in the number of 
generalized grievances about the conduct of government made 
it wise to refuse to give relief to such plaintiffs. 15 In contrast, 
Justice Douglas' concurrence in Flast was based on the proposi-
tion that citizens should act as "private attorneys general" to 
make certain that the Constitution is followed. 16 
As noted by Justice Harlan, the Flast criteria are not nec-
essary to achieve the "adverseness" which results from one 
having a personal stake in the controversy. Justice Powell 
noted in United States v. Richardson, drawing on Harlan's 
dissent in Flast: 
A plaintiff's incentive to challenge an expenditure does not 
turn on the 'unconnected fact' that it relates to a regulatory 
rather than a spending program . . . or on whether the con-
stitutional provision on which he relies is a 'specific limita-
tion' upon Congress' spending powers.17 
Rather, a plaintiff who is concerned that tax revenues are being 
used for an unconstitutional program will be equally concerned 
regardless of whether the money is expended in direct grants 
or in administrative costs of a regulatory program. Indeed, 
some large regulatory agencies may be more costly than pro-
grams of direct aid to private schools}8 The interest of the 
taxpayer is equally strong whether the expenditure is specifi-
cally prohibited or simply not authorized by the Constitution. 
stances equitable relief is warranted. Even if the law has been violated, the equity 
court may refuse to grant remedies. See Comment, Threat of Enforcement-Pre-
requisite of a Justiciable Controversy, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 106, 126 (1962). 
15 392 U.S. at 129 n.18 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
11 
"I would not be niggardly . . . in giving private attorneys general standing to 
sue." Id. at 111 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
17 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 183 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
18 Federal funds expended for non-public schools under Titles I and II of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 totaled $50,175,000 in 1971. 'l'HE 
PRESIDENT's CoMMISSION oN ScHooL FINANCE, Pusuc Am To NoNPUBLIC SCHooLS v 
(1971). Expenditures for the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board were $71,127,000 and $61,760,000 respectively for 1971. EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT 438, 467 (1972). 
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Persons may be more opposed to federal expenditures if the 
states are competent to act in the area in question than they 
would be to a program which violated a specific constitutional 
prohibition. 19 
A taxpayer's interest in these controversies, if he is not 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, is that the government 
should act in a constitutional manner. All citizens have a simi-
lar claim that the government should behave constitutionally: 
Since the powers and procedures of government were estab-
lished and limited by agreement of the citizens,20 the govern-
ment has no claim to legitimacy apart from that agreement. As 
parties to the agreement, the citizens and their successors 
should have the ability to compel the government to conform 
to it. The taxpayer is limited to challenges of government ex-
penditures, whereas the citizen may object to any government 
misbehavior. The citizen's standing to object to governmental 
activity in general should be analyzed in the same manner as 
the standing of taxpayers to object to expenditures. 
The assertion that citizens should be able to compel the 
government to follow constitutional limitations does not inevit-
ably lead to the conclusion that they have a right to invoke the 
judicial process for this purpose. Neither the language of Arti-
cle ill21 nor the history of this right as an Article ill "case or 
11 See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.447 (1923). Conservative commenta-
tors, such as William F. Buckley, have been vociferous in their condemnation of federal 
control. 
Let . • • localities experiment with different solutions, and let the natural 
desire of the individual for more goods, and better education, and more 
leisure, find satisfaction in individual encounters with the marketplace, in 
the growth of private schools, in the myraid economic and charitable activi-
ties which, because they took root in the individual imagination and im-
pulse, take organic form, and then let us see whether we are better off than 
we would be living by decisions made between nine and five in Washington 
office rooms . • • . 
W. BuCKLEY, UP FRoM LIBERALISM 228-29 (1968). 
211 U.S. CaNST. preamble. 
21 Dictionary definitions of "case" are circular. WEBSTER's SEVENTH CoLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 129 (7th ed. 1971) defines "case,'' as used in law, as "[a] suit or action in 
law or equity." If the power of the court to entertain a suit depends on whether it is a 
"case,'' the court can entertain a suit only if it is a suit. 
The dictionary is even less helpful with respect to "controversy." Its use in article 
ill to describe judicial power over matters involving a state or the United States as a 
party or diversity actions is not reflected in modem common usage. I d. at 182. 
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controversy"22 compel a decision either way on the existence of 
such a right. The function of positing such a right is simply to 
assure the citizen's ability to make the government obey the 
constitution. Therefore, the critical question should be whether 
the citizen's desire to have the government conform to consti-
tutional commands is most effectively secured by judicial re-
view. If so, the right of the citizen to have the government obey 
constitutional provisions should be cognizable in court. This 
question should have been the focus of the Court in Flast. To 
decide whether the result in Flast was proper, it is necessary 
22 Although an inquiry into the rights of citizens and taxpayers at the time of the 
adoption of article ill may be relevant to this question, such an examination is not 
helpful because the Constitution represented a radical change in the structure of 
government. In eighteenth-century England, the ultimate power to create, alter, and 
determine the framework of government rested with the King and Parliament. Parlia-
ment: 
can regulate or new model the succession to the crown; as was done in the 
reign of Henry vm and William ill. It can alter the established religion of 
the land . . . . It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the 
kingdom and of parliaments themselves; as was done by the act of union, 
and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. 
1 BLACKSTONE CoMMENTARIES 161 (6th ed. 1765). If there were objection to a governmen-
tal act, Parliament had the final authority as to the act's propriety. Even action clearly 
contrary to established statute or custom could be legalized by Acts of Indemnity. A. 
DICEY, THE LAw OF THE CoNSTITUTION 49-50 (lOth ed. 1965). The citizen's right not to 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property was coextensive with the sovereignty of Parlia-
ment. See D. KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485 at 294-
95 (8th ed. 1966). All objections to the operations of government would have been 
addressed to Parliament, a political body, rather than to the judiciary. DICEY, supra, 
at 63. In other words, the English citizen in the eighteenth century had no right to a 
particular framework of government. Id. at 91. 
The English citizen may have had an idea of natural law-of how government 
ought to be structured-but he had no conception that his ideas of the proper opera-
tions of government should be judicially enforceable. Id. at 47-48. 
Meanwhile the new American nation was developing a unique governmental form. 
The American Revolution was originally justified in English terms. The King had 
violated the conditions under which his American subjects consented to be governed 
and, thereby, had justified the political act of revolution. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 46-47 (1967). In the decade after independence, 
however, disenchantment with the English concept of representative rule grew. The 
will of the people was not identified with the acts of the state legislatures. See G. 
WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 at 280 (1969). The "people" 
were viewed as an entity distinct from their representatives. The Constitution was 
proclaimed as being established by "the people," not legislatures. U.S. CoNST. pream-
ble. Only in America was the framework of government a product of a compact among 
the citizens. Thus, only in the United States could a citizen justifiably believe himself 
to have a right to have the government operate in a particular fashion. 
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to examine citizen standing with a view toward the effective-
ness of vindicating citizens' constitutional rights in court in 
light of the interests of the parties.23 Examination of these in-
terests demonstrates that the Court reached the right result for 
the wrong reasons. 
fl. THE INTEREST OF THE PARTIES 
A. Non-Political Injury Suits: The Better Plaintiff Rule 
Whenever an unconstitutional governmental action in-
jures a person (the "victim") or his property, all citizens ofthat 
government may feel injured as well. This feeling flows from 
several sources. They may perceive that, as electors, they are 
responsible for, and discredited by, the unconstitutional ac-
tions of the government. Further, as citizens, their relationship 
to the government is based on the Constitution, and violation 
of that document provides a potential threat to every citizen's 
relationship with his government. 
Nevertheless, the courts will not permit all citizens to 
bring suit to halt the government's acts. It is thought that the 
victim will present the issues better and that separate suit by 
the citizen may result in poor decisions. 
If a citizen brings suit, the court's natural response is to 
ask "why isn't the victim here?" If the victiJn does not feel 
sufficiently injured to seek redress, the injury appears minimal. 
The court is thus apt to give insufficient weight to the serious-
ness of the injury. 
The presence of the citizen could also produce inadequate 
consideration of all possible issues. The injury to the citizen is 
basically an affront to his conception of the constitutional func-
tioning of government. His concern with a particular constitu-
tional guarantee may suppress any interest in exploring every 
possible defense to the governmental action. The affected indi-
vidual is interested in all possible defenses. By taking only the 
victim's case, the court may discover that a non-constitutional 
23 
"The interest of the parties" refers to the distinction between proprietary and 
political interests, compare section IIA infra with section liB infra, as well as the 
further division between interests in common to all persons and interests applicable 
to minority groups, see section m infra. 
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issue will dispose of the problem or that several constitutional 
questions deserve consideration. 
The vigor with which the citizen plaintiff will press the 
case may also be suspect~ Since he stands to lose nothing in the 
way of personal property or freedom of action, he may raise an 
issue as idle speculation.- Some citizens, either individually or 
supported by larger groups, would pursue the case vigorously 
on all grounds but others would not. 
Other problems would arise if both citizens and victims 
were permitted to sue for injuries to the victim. Since the citi-
zen's suit would not preclude a suit brought by the victim, 21 
multiple law suits over the same factual problem would result. 
Further; the citizen~s suit would be stare decisis in a later suit 
by the victim. Since the citizen is not likely to present as ap-
pealing a case as the victim, allowing the citizen to sue may 
place an e~tra burden on the victim of overcoming the effect 
of.adverse stare decisis. For all these reasons, the courts have 
wisely refused to grant citizen or taxpayer standing to seek 
remedies for injuries to identifiable individuals. . 
Occasionally, an act results both in specific injury to an 
irid~vidual and a more general harm to a group. For example, 
a proposed development may harm adjacent property owners 
or property owners whose land is taken. At the same time, the 
nature of the development could result in ugliness or pollution 
that would effect everyone who uses the area.25 The interests of 
the latter group are very distinct from those of the former and 
may make it desirable for both to sue. The property owner's 
interest may be satisfied by sufficient compensation while the 
public user can vindicate his interest only by stopping the pro-
ject. Since the property owner's financial interests may run 
counter to the interest of the public user, standing should be 
granted tQ both groups. 
The conflict between the interest of the person suffering 
n "[M]embers of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound 
by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are 
present .... "Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). The interest of the victim 
is quite distinct from that of the citizen and cannot be adequately represented by the 
citizen alone without the victim's consent . 
.. This situation occurs frequently in environmental suits. See United States v. 
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
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specific injury and the interests of persons injured generally 
will not occur if the general injury is simply that the govern-
ment acted wrongly in injuring the specific individual. Recom-
pense for the specific injury will sufficiently satisfy the interest 
of the citizen. Given the possibility of both citizen and victim 
satisfaction by means of the victim's suit, the above mentioned 
reasons for granting standing only to the victim are again ap-
plicable. Thus even in the relaxed form of standing in federal 
statutory actions, the Court has mandated that a plaintiff show 
more specific injury than violation of the statute and disagree-
ment with such action.26 
B. Political Injury Suits: Wrong Reasons for the Right Result 
Some laws or activities produce no specific harm despite 
their alleged unconstitutionality. When a senator is appointed 
to an office whose remuneration he voted to increase, the na-
ture of the violation threatens no citizen's life, liberty, or prop-
erty.27 Rather, a possibility exists that the political process was 
skewed when the legislature voted to increase the salary for 
that position. Such an injury will be referred to as a "political 
injury." Since the right to have government follow the pre-
scribed constitutional norms is common to all citizens, no sin-
gle citizen has a better right than another to raise the issue. 
The lack of a victim in the sense used in the preceding discus-
sion removes a major reason to bar the- citizen suit. The willing-
ness of a particular citizen to bring suit indicates sufficient 
injury and resourcefulness to allow that citizen to bring suit. 
In a suit by a citizen to remedy a "political injury," the 
citizen plaintiff is as much a victim as any other possible plain-
tiff. While financial or other personal loss may occur as a result 
of a "political injury," it would not be the type of injui:y with 
which the violated constitutional provision is concerned. 28 The 
21 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
n The violation is of U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 6. ·Whether specific harm results was 
intensely debated during the nomination of William Saxbe as Attorney General. A suit 
claiming violation of this provision when Justice Black was appointed to the Supreme 
Court was dismissed for lack of standing. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). See 
text accompanying notes 68-69 for a discussion of the case. 
21 The constitutional provisions in question protect the political process froll;l 
being improperly influenced and are not designed to punish the individual who might 
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type of injury which the Constitution forbids in these cases is 
that done to all citizens. In several cases subsequent to Flast, 
members of the Court have given different reasons for denying 
standing to such injured citizens. However, the reasons prof-
fered have been inadequate. 
1. Abstract Nature of Issues in Suit by Citizen for Political 
Injury 
A "political injury" is by definition abstract-i.e., no indi-
vidual can show loss of property or impairment of liberty. The 
only loss is of the right to have the government act in a speci-
fied way. Whether the government acts in a certain way may 
or may not be personally beneficial to the individual. For ex-
ample, whether a Congressman who is a member of the reserves 
will favor the military is entirely speculative-his connection 
may result in a very critical view of their function, while strip-
ping him of his reserve commission may make him more rather 
than less amenable to military interests. 
In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 29 
the Court discussed the reasons for giving preference to con-
crete injuries by saying: 
[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated upon an interest 
. . . which is held in common by all members of the public, 
because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury all 
citizens share. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, 
is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in 
part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial reso-
lution. . . . This personal stake is what the Court has consis-
tently held enables a complainant authoritatively to present 
to a court a complete perspective upon the adverse conse-
quences flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding his 
grievance. . . . Only concrete injury presents the factual 
context within which a court, aided by parties who argue 
within the context, is capable of making decision.30 
otherwise obtain office, etc. The constitutional right therefore is that of the citizen qua 
citizen and not of the incidentally injured individual. "Ordinarily, one may not claim 
standing in this Court to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party." 
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). See also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 
288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional 
Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962). 
Zl 418 u.s. 208 (1974). 
30 Id. at 220-21. 
HeinOnline -- 67 Ky. L.J. 157 1978-1979
1978-79] TAXPAYER AND CITIZEN STANDING 157 
This attack is filled with conclusions rather than reasons. 
The "abstract injury" also presents a "factual context." There 
is no speculation about what kind of conduct has occurred. The 
challenge which the Court raises is whether the citizen-plaintiff 
presents "a complete perspective upon the adverse conse-
quences flowing from the specific set of facts." The "political 
injury" stems from a violation of prophylactic rules designed 
to prevent impropriety in the political process. For example, 
the rule requiring senators to be thirty years of age31 appears 
designed to assure a quantity of experience and maturity. A 
particular twenty-eight-year-old person may have experience 
and maturity far beyond his years, but the adverse conse-
quences of his election are that the rules have been violated and 
the individualization which the rules intended to avoid has 
become the fact. The individual who is willing to pay the costs 
of litigation will claim that all citizens have an interest in 
preventing such violations. This impetus thus insures the pres-
entation of "a complete perspective upon adverse conse-
quences" to the courts. 
The Court in Schlesinger felt that denial of standing for 
abstract injuries furthers the principle of avoiding unnecessary 
constitutional adjudication. Concrete injury indicates there is 
a real need to exercise the power of judicial review in order to 
protect the interests of the complaining party.32 However, the 
Court is bootstrapping. The interest of the complaining party 
in political injury cases is to preserve the kind of government 
which he feels the Constitution provides. The Court can find 
that there is no need to resolve the question only if it refuses 
to acknowledge the interest of the citizen in preserving the 
constitutional system. 
Finally, concrete injury is said to assure "the framing of 
relief no more broad than required by the precise facts. "33 1f the 
political injury ·consists of continued or threatened actions, the 
remedy will be an order requiring the cessation of the unconsti-
tutional activities. If the act has occurred in the past and the 
01 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3. "No person shall be a Senator who shall not have 
attained to the Age of thirty Years." 
'
2 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974) . 
.. Id. at 222. 
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Court can only deal with the consequences of it, remedial prob-
lems may, indeed, be difficult. However, remedial solutions to 
concrete injuries may also be complex. Environmental injuries 
may not be compensable in dollar damages, 34 yet suits have not 
been dismissed on the grounds of remedial difficulty. The 
Court is unconvincing when it complains of possible over-
breadth in remedy. Surely the Court, if it took such suits, 
would tread carefully to limit the disruption of the political 
process. 
2. Sporadic Nature of Review 
Justice Powell, concurring in United States v. 
Richardson, 35 argued that citizen-taxpayer standing should be 
denied because of the sporadic nature of review it would pro-
vide. Such review was felt to be an even less desirable system 
than that which would have been provided by the Council of 
Revision, rejected by the Constitutional Convention. 
Unrestrained standing in federal taxpayer or citizen suits 
would create a remarkably illogical system of judicial super-
vision of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government. 
·Randolph's proposed Council of Revision, which was repeat-
edly rejected by the Framers, at least had the virtue of being 
systematic; every law passed by the legislature automatically 
would have been previewed by the Judiciary before the law 
could take effect. On the other hand, since the Judiciary 
cannot select the taxpayers or citizens who bring suit or the 
nature of the suits, the allowance of public actions would 
produce uneven and sporadic review, the quality of which 
would be influenced by the resources and skill of the particu-
lar plaintiff. 38 
On reflection, however, the irregular nature of review in-
herent in ·citizen suits· may be a virtue rather than a vice. It 
remedies the most glaring defects of the Council of Revision. 
First, the citizen suit challenges only the law's constitution-
ality, not its wisdom.37 Even if a Council of Revision were lim-
34 See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 
u.s. 669 (1973). 
35 418 u.s. 166, 189-91 (1974). 
:st !d. (Powell, J ., concurring). 
st The original proposal for a Council of Revision suggested a combination of court 
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ited to constitutional review, the power to review all legislation 
might tempt such a body to strike down laws with which it 
disagreed. 
Second, should a Council of Revision limit itself to consti-
tutional review, it would probably perform the task poorly. The 
volume of legislative and executive acts subject to review would 
make conscientious decisions on constitutionality impossible. 
Should the number of acts be reduced, automatic review would 
still make it difficult to focus on and explore the constitutional 
deficiencies. The citizen-taxpayer suit avoids these difficulties. 
The costs of litigation reduce the volume of acts to be reviewed 
to manageable proportions and assure presentation of suffi-
ciently focused arguments. 
Powell identifies two further difficulties stemming from 
the sporadic nature of citizen suits. One is that the quality of 
judicial review will be uneven and will depend on the wealth 
and skill of the plaintiff. This problem does not distinguish 
citizen "political injury" suits from any other suits. Victims 
cover the spectrum of skills and resources which they can 
devote to litigation. The citizen "political injury" suit is likely 
to be presented as well as the suit in which a "victim" urges 
relief. · 
The second concern with citizen standing is that such 
standing might result in most litigation being brought by a 
limited number of political groups which have been disap-
pointed in the legislative process. If the challenges come only 
from wealthy or well-organized groups, the impact of such suits 
may result in some distortion of the total mass of legislative 
and executive action.38 The impact on governmental actions 
will be more random if suits depend on existence of a victim. 
Fears of political power distortion through citizen-taxpayer 
suits can be greatly exaggerated. In all likelihood, groups will-
and executive to veto legislation. The grounds for such a veto were not limited to the 
Constitution. Eventually, the presidential veto was accepted by the original conven-
tion and served the purpose of Randolph's proposal. See 1M. FARRAND, THE REcoRDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 21 (1911); J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 at 208-210 (1971). 
u H the legislature's power is limited only at the behest of certain social groups, 
the resulting network of laws will favor those groups more so than if no groups or all 
groups challenged such laws. 
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ing to pay the costs of litigation do so because they feel impor-
tant principles have been violated and that a court will so find. 
Serious affronts to fundamental principles are likely to find 
citizen-group challengers while baseless or trivial claims will be 
deterred by the costs of litigation. The few baseless or trivial 
claims or claims brought only to buttress a particular political 
position may be an acceptable price to pay to assure the integ-
rity of governmental operations. 
3. Compelled Confrontation 
The justices who would deny standing to citizens and tax-
payers in "political injury" suits have expressed their desire to 
avoid confrontation with coordinate branches of government.39 
However, if the "political injury" is both sufficiently serious 
u United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
"[R]epeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch 
and the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial 
to either." See also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 
222 (1974). 
Repeated confrontations with coordinate branches of government can result in 
those branches retaliating against the courts-the legislature by its control of finances 
and jurisdiction and the executive through the power to appoint justices and the need 
for executive support to implement decisions. The heart of the Court's defense against 
this has been that it is only doing its duty. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137 (1803). 
However, if a decision may rest on a non-constitituional base, the Court cannot 
justify reaching the constitutional issue. Many grounds exist for avoiding constitu-
tional decisions. See Ashwanderv. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring): 
The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in ad-
vance of the necessity of deciding it.'. . . 3. The Court will not 'formulate a 
rule ~f constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to 
which it is to be applied.'. . . 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitu-
tional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also 
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of . . . . 
7. 'When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question and even 
if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that 
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly 
possible by which the question may be avoided.' 
ld. at 346-48. Such refusal may be based on the behavior of the party seeking relief 
("[t]he Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of 
one who has availed himself of its benefits." ld. at 348); the lack of adversariness 
("[t]he Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-
adversary, proceeding . . . .'' I d. at 346); or the failure of the plaintiff to show injury 
("[t]he Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who 
fails to show that he is injured by its operation.'' ld. at 347). 
HeinOnline -- 67 Ky. L.J. 161 1978-1979
1978-79] TAXPAYER AND CITIZEN STANDING 161 
and suitable for judicial resolution, the wish to avoid confron-
tation does not justify refusal to grant standing. 
The fear of confrontation or of assuming a role of "general 
supervision"40 may be exaggerated. Citizens or taxpayers 
should be unable to sue when governmental action results in 
potential victim plaintiffs. Thus, citizens should have no 
standing to challenge regulatory programs; such programs pro-
duce readily determinable victims. Permissible litigation for 
citizens would be largely confined to spending programs and 
discretionary appointments. 
In such cases, the substantive law of federal spending 
power41 and discretion in appointments42 would result in the 
dismissal of most suits for failure to state a claim. A readiness 
to resolve the few claims of unconstitutional action which fit 
within the "political injury" definition and are outside of the 
broad discretionary powers in the legislative and executive 
branches would do little to damage respect for the judiciary. 
4. Adequacy of Political Remedy 
"Our system of government leaves many crucial decisions 
to the political processes. The assumption that if respondents 
40 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
Justice Powell argues that the Court has historically limited its role to vindicating 
rights of 
I d. 
individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory 
government action. It is this role, not some amorphous general supervision 
of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the 
federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the counter-
majoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles 
upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests. 
u "Congress has a substantive power to tax and appropriate for the general wel-
fare, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised for the common benefit 
as distinguished from some mere local purpose." United States v. Gerlach Live Stock 
Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
u Most cases involving appointment to government office have involved an avail-
able victim injured by dismissals, suspensions, or refusals to renew contracts. Chal-
lenges to appointments on the grounds of violating the rights of a .competitor also 
provide a classic victim. If the challenge is based on violation of constitutional provi-
sions for appointment, the Court has found that citizen complainants have no stand-
ing. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). Nevertheless, there are very few explicit 
restrictions on appointments. Most restrictions on appointments are in legislation 
creating the office, so issues of standing become statutory. 
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have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a 
reason to find standing."43 This quote from the Court's opinion 
in Schlesinger turns the argument for citizen-taxpayer stand-
ing on its head. All citizens should have a right to assure that 
the government is acting in a legitimate fashion. The existence 
of a specific "victim" will permit the Court to find that the 
citizen-plaintiff is not the appropriate party. However, where 
no victim exists, there should be no impediment to citizen 
standing. 
The reference to the political process begs the question. 
Although the Constitution leaves many issues of public policy 
to the discretion of the legislature and the executive, few issues 
of co.nstitutional interpretation are explicitly committed to 
those branches. Since the Constitution cannot be changed ex-
cept through the amendment process, 44 it is largely Immune 
from the majoritarian political process. If the constitutional 
provision in question is intended to protect a particular right 
from the majoritarian political process, the Court should not 
remand the plaintiff to those same processes. The critical ques-
tion should center on tpe nature of the constitutional provision 
in question and whether the particular provision would be more 
effective if enforced by citizen suits. This issue has not been 
addressed by the Court. 
ill. STANDING AS A FUNCTION OF INTERESTS PROTECTED BY THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE BETTER PLAINTIFF REVISITED 
The courts have viewed standing from its own perspec-
tive-whether the plaintiff has a sufficient stake to guarantee 
adverse parties and whether the issue can be dealt with by the 
court. However, the underlying concern should be whether ju-
dicial review will best ensure that the Constitution is followed. 
A substantial consensus appears to favor litigation and judicial 
review as the ultimate assurance of constitutional obedience.45 
This feeling in tum involves the assumption that the Court is 
u 418 u.s. 208, 227 (1974). 
u U.S. CONST. art. V. 
u President Nixon's compliance with the Court's orders in United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683 (1974), is some evidence ofthis acceptance. See also C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE 
AND THE Coi.JRT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY (1960). 
HeinOnline -- 67 Ky. L.J. 163 1978-1979
1978-79] TAXPAYER AND CITIZEN STANDING 163 
the most acceptable body for interpretation of constitutional 
provisions. Standing doctrine, like related justiciability issues, 
should be built upon assuring the acceptance of the decision 
and of the necessity for any resulting confrontation with an-
other governmental branch. To ensure this acceptance, stand-
ing doctrine should be interpreted with a view toward the par-
ticular constitutional provision alleged to have been violated 
and whether that provision can best be enforced by citizen 
suits. 
A. Individual Standing 
The Constitution explicitly prohibits certain actions. Most 
of these prohibitions are intended to prevent harm to the indi-
vidual by the government. The standing question here is 
usually easily resolved; violation of such a prohibition causes 
injury to the life, liberty, or property of an individual. In some 
situations it may be difficult to find standing for violations of 
individual rights. In Warth v. Seldin, 48 the Court denied stand-
ing to a variety of individuals and groups who had alleged that 
restrictive zoning practices violated their fourteenth amend-
ment rights. There were further problems of ripeness, moot-
ness, and third party (jus tertii) standing. However, even in 
Warth, the Court was able to posit a plaintiff who would have 
standing because he was directly affected by the challenged 
act. Thus, while disputes may arise as to appropriate plaintiffs, 
a hypothetical legitimate plaintiff can invariably be perceived 
when the government allegedly invades a prohibition directed 
at securing individual rights. The individual victim makes 
standing an easy question with respect to most constitutional 
provisions. Since most claims alleging constitutional violations 
challenge provisions which protect identifiable groups, there 
will be a better plaintiff than an ordinary citizen in most cases. 
B. Federalism and State Standing 
The Constitution establishes various institutions of gov-
u 422 U.S. 490 (1975). For factors showing who might be a proper plaintiff in a 
Warth type suit, see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252 (1977), where standing to challenge restrictive zoning practices was found for an 
individual who alleged that he sought and would qualify for a particular planned 
project that was forbidden by the zoning law. 
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ernment and provides grants of power to those institutions and 
prohibitions on particular conduct by those institutions. The 
grants of power are a means of allocating power among the 
branches of the federal government and between the federal 
and state governments.47 
This allocation of power may serve to protect the individ-
ual citizen;48 he is less likely to have legislation affect him 
adversely if fewer institutions have the power to do so. If the 
individual is deprived of life, liberty, or property through a 
governmental act which exceeds the powers granted the acting· 
body, the individual will have standing.49 However, if the only 
adverse effect is that action is taken with which the individual 
disagrees and believes inappropriate for the acting body to 
take, there is a victim with a better basis for suit: the govern-
mental body whose power has been usurped. 50 In such cases, 
the issue raised is one· of standing for the governmental 
body-most frequently the state. 
The state may attempt to bring sujt on behalf of its citi-
zens. This effort runs afoul of two problems. First, if the citi-
zens themselves are inappropriate plaintiffs, the state cannot 
obtain standing by relying on them. 51 Second, the proper insti-
tution to represent the citizens may be the federal govern-
u With respect to concepts of federalism, see U.S. CoNsT. amend. X: "The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 
43 See Strong, Court vs. Constitution: Disparate Distortions of the Indirect Limi-
tations in the American Constitutional Framework, 54 N.C. L. REv. 125 {1976). 
n If the government seeks to deprive the individual of life, liberty or property in 
a judicial proceeding, the individual may raise the unconstitutionality of the govern-
ment's action in defense. If the act takes place outside a judicial proceeding, standing 
to sue may depend on whether the constitutional right allegedly invaded was for the 
benefit of the injured party. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 {1936). 
50 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 {1968). The Court refers to Mrs. Frothingham's 
suit to prevent a federal spending program known as the Maternity Act of 1921: 
In essence, Mrs. Frothingham was attempting to assert the States' inter-
est in their legislative prerogatives and not a federal taxpayer's interest in 
being free of taxing and spending in contravention of specific constitutional 
limitations imposed upon Congress' taxing and spending power. 
Id. at 105. 
•• Citizens do not become more appropriate plaintiffs because some other body 
represents them. If the state is appropriate, it must be because of the state's interest 
and not that of its citizens. See Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 {1976), which 
says that a State may sue only when its sovereign interests, not merely the personal 
claims of its citizens, are implicated. 
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ment. 52 While the state may be the guardian of its citizens vis-
a-vis other states, the federal government is the guardian if the 
relationship under attack is national. 53 If the state wishes to sue 
on its own behalf to prevent federal action in an area which the 
state claims is reserved for state action, it will have standing 
or can create a situation in which individuals have standing if 
it passes legislation which conflicts with federal law. 54 
Thus, when the complained-of act is a product of a conflict 
over the allocation of powers, citizen-taxpayer standing is not 
needed in order to enforce a particular constitutional provision. 
A better plaintiff exists in the form of the offended government 
body. When a bona fide conflict exists over the allocation of 
powers, the appropriate institution will possess the requisite of 
adversity and a "personal stake." 
C. Institutional Processes 
Some constitutional prohibitions are not directed at pro-
tecting individuals from injury by government but are directed 
at preserving the integrity of government itself. It is this group 
of protections which causes the greatest difficulty in standing 
analysis; violation of the constitutional command provides no 
specific victim. No individual can claim physical or economic 
injury, but a potential threat to the democratic processes is 
called into question. For example, there is a minimum age 
u See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
It cannot be conceded that a State as parens patriae may institute 
judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the opera-
tion of the statutes thereof • • . . In that field it is the United States, and 
not the State, which represents them as parens patriae . • . . 
Id. at 485-86. 
53 Id. 
51 However, the federal law may be designed to prevent such a clash. For example, 
conditional grants do not conflict with any state law, but merely fail to operate when 
the state does not meet the condition: "[T]he powers of the State are not invaded, 
since the statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the state 
is free to accept or reject." I d. at 480. If the state chooses not to legislate because it 
does not want the federal grant, there can be no conflict. If the state chooses to fulfill 
the conditions of the grant, it will benefit from the federal action and thus have no 
basis for suit. Ashwanderv. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,348 (1936). However, if the state wants 
the federal grant but does not want to meet all of the federal conditions, it may 
legislate in partial compliance with the federal grant and thus be in a position to 
complain that the conditions placed upon the grant are an unconstitutional invasion 
of state powers. 
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requirement for each of the offices of representative, 55 senator, 56 
and president;57 a prohibition on appointment of members of 
Congress to offices created or whose compensation was in-
creased during their term;58 a prohibition against members of 
Congress holding concurrently any other office under the 
United States;58 a restriction on the receipt of presents, com-
pensation, offices, or titles from any foreign state by a federal 
office holder;60 a:hd a limitation of the presidency to two elected 
terms. 61 Also, the Constitution requires publication of an ac-
count of receipts and expenditures of all public money.62 
The basic purpose of these provisions is to protect the 
political process ·from recognized dangers-immaturity, self-
inte~est; foreign domination, secrecy, or perpetuation in the 
form of dependence on the individual leader rather than the 
democratic system. While some individual may receive an in-
jury from ali action forbidden by such constitutional com-
mands, such an injury is incidental; there is no suggestion that 
the violated provisions were enacted to protect specific individ-
ual intere.sts. 63 Instead, these constitutional commands are 
drawn to protect the democratic system. Thus, some individu-
~ls have seen these clauses as appropriate for enforcement by 
~y citizE:ln l;Jecaus~ every citizen has an interest in a properly 
functioning political system. · · · 
55 
"No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of 
twenty five Years." U.S. CaNST .. art. I, § 2, cl.2. 
51 
"No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty 
Years." U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 3, cl.3. 
· 
11 
"No Person ..• shall be eligible to the Office of President ••. who shall not 
have attained to the Age of thirty five Years." u.s. CaNST. art. n, cl.5. 
11 
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, 
be app6inted to any civii Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall 
have been created, or the E~oluments whereof shall have been increased during such 
time •••. " U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 6, cl.2. 
" ·"[N]o Pers'on holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member 
of' either House during his Continuance in Office." u.s. CaNST. art. I, § 6, cl.2. 
• "[N)o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States], 
shall, without the Consent of Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or 
Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State." U.S. CaNST. art. 
I, § 9, cl.8. · 
11 
"No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice ..•• " 
u.s. CaNST. amend. xxn, § 1. , 
12 
"[A) regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all 
public Money shall be published from time to time." U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 9, c1.7. 
13 See note 28 supra for related material and further discussion. 
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At this point we have reason to revert to the fundamental 
issue-whether granting standing to such persons will best as-
sure that the Constitution is followed. Judicial review enforces 
constitutional guarantees not merely through the particular 
orders of the Court but also by the deterrence effect which the 
threat of judicial response provides. 64 Even if citizens are de-
nied standing to redress "political injuries," the government 
official considering potentially unconstitutional action still 
faces the possibility of check from another body. Certain indi-
viduals or groups can force a confrontation before the courts. 
For example, election officials may refuse to list a candidate on 
the ballot because the candidate fails to meet the age qualifica-
tions. Legislators tempted to increase rewards of an office they 
desire may be thwarted by presidential failure to appoint or 
congressional refusal to confirm. Presidents tempted to keep 
gifts may be faced with congressional legislation to the con-
trary, and an executive desire to keep expenditures hidden may 
be defeated by a congressional command for a statement of 
accounts. Flagrant attempts to violate the process provisions 
are likely to be challenged by bodies who have no interest in 
seeing the Constitution violated. Thus the existence of the con-
stitutional prohibition and the power of disinterested individu-
als or groups to prevent a violation secures a large measure of 
obedience to the constitutional dictates. 
Nevertheless, individual citizens may perceive a violation 
of a process provision that is not attacked by any other individ-
ual or group. If such an individual brings suit to remedy the 
improper action, that suit will present the Court with difficul-
ties that would not be present if suit had been brought pur-
suant to a statute or against an official who claims constitu-
tional grounds mandate his actions-such as an official who 
refuses to list a candidate for election. The Court must go be-
yond merely deciding whether the act violates the Constitu-
tion. It must also develop a remedy. If the act is pending, the 
Court will refuse to take the case because the injury may not 
11 To some extent, this statement cannot be proved. We have, however, a deep 
tradition for obeying court orders. See Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965) on the extent to which judicial decisions may be ignored 
by government officials. 
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occur.85 Once the act has taken place, however, the remedy will 
never successfully eliminate the violation.66 These remedial dif-
ficulties alone do not justify a refusal to hear the case, 67 but 
they do indicate that the more focused case precipitated by 
another group would be preferable. The remedial difficulties 
which make the case awkward are demonstrated by the follow-
ing. 
Justice Black was appointed to the Supreme Court al-
though he was a member of the federal legislature when pen-
sions were established for members of the Court. A citizen later 
sued, claiming that Justice Black's subsequent appointment to 
the Supreme Court violated the Constitution. 68 The Court dis-
missed the suit for lack of standing. If the Court had taken the 
case, it would hav.e faced a bewildering array of alternatives. 
It might have barred Justice Black from future deliberations 
and from drawing any salary, imposed a temporary bar until 
the next session of the legislature, reversed all decisions in 
which he participated and set them for reargument, changed 
orders only in those decisions where Justice Black provided the 
margin for decision, invalidated the pension entirely or only as 
applied to Justice Black, or held the appointment to be consti-
tutional. The constitutional provision is apparently intended to 
prevent a vote influenced by the desire to obtain the office 
concerned. If the vote is taken, no subsequent penalty against 
the legislator will undo the vote. An attempt to undo the vote 
by invalidating the salary increase has several drawbacks, 
among them the fact that the law becomes invalid as a result 
of action subsequent to its enactment.69 
The point of this discussion is quite simple. Whenever a 
"process provision" is violated, there are always individuals or 
15 This is in furtherance of the judicial policy of refusing to decide a constitutional 
issue before it is necessary to do so. See note 39 supra for further discussion. 
" Even in the cases where the remedy would be fairly effective, such as forcing a 
statement of expenditures of public funds, there will be a period in which no such 
statement has been published and the delay is likely to result in some actions being 
taken in ignorance. 
11 See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra for a justification of this statement. 
" Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). 
" This creates problems for those who received increased salaries prior to the 
legislator's appointment. The provision itself appears directed at appointment rather 
than at prohibiting the vote. 
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groups with power to raise the issues who would present a bet-
ter case than the average citizen. Since the interest of those 
groups and individuals is the same as the average citizen's, it 
would be preferable for such other persons to raise the issue. 
In the event that none of the more desirable groups raises 
the constitutional issue, there is still no significant threat to 
that structure of government envisioned by the Constitution. 
Flagrant violations of the basic process provisions are unlikely 
to occur. The existence of the language of the prohibition and 
groups with power to challenge constitutional violations will 
sufficiently deter violations. If the individual citizen does bring 
suit without the support of those groups in a better situation 
to present the case, the court is likely to be unsympathetic. If 
standing is granted, the courts may tend to favor the fait 
accompli and thereby create a body of constitutional interpre-
tation which permits action close to the constitutional line. 
This in turn will weaken the arguments available to individuals 
and groups in a position to challenge subsequent similar acts. 
The net effect of permitting citizen standing to attack 
"process" violations could well be to weaken constitutional 
guarantees. The basic interest of the citizen is in the effective 
operation of the system of government, yet citizen standing for 
violation of a process provision is likely to reduce the effective-
ness of that same provision. 
IV. NEW WINE IN AN OLD F'LAST 
In the recent cases in which the Court denied standing, the 
citizen plaintiff alleged a "process provision" violation which 
harmed all persons in society equally, 70 not a minority group 
which needed special protection from the majoritarian process. 
Even though these constitutional provisions are insulated from 
the majoritarian process, there are, as previously noted, suffi-
cient checks without citizen standing. 
Violation of the guarantees of establishment and religious 
freedom stands on quite different footing. These provisions are 
71 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). All citizens are entitled to a legislature 
without conflicts of interests and to a statement of accounts, which were the questions 
at issue in these two cases, respectively. 
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evidently intended to protect religious minorities from the reli-
gious majority. Often the standing issue poses no problem for 
challenges to alleged first amendment religious freedom viola-
tions. A law may either prohibit religious activity or command 
it, thus impinging on the liberty of the individual and produc-
ing a "victim" who has standing. Other co-religionists not di-
rectly subject to the law may be offended by it, but they have 
no standing. Thus, in Doremus v. Board of Education, 11 the 
Court held that there was no standing in citizens or taxpayers 
to protest Bible reading in schools although the school children 
themselves would have standing.72 
Flast, however, poses a situation without identifiable vic-
tims. Instead of compelling persons to accept or reject a partic-
ular religion, the government merely gives money to one reli-
gion. The use of the governmental process to foster religious 
beliefs antithetical to ·some citizens violates the rights of those 
persons (presumably a minority) to be free of governmental aid 
to opposing religious viewpoints. Injury arising from aid to 
competing religions is that kind of harm which the Constitu-
tion intended to prevent. 73 Thus persons with views opposing 
those given aid should have standing. Unlike the "process" 
violations in which the injury is identical as to all citizens, 
violations of the establishment clause affect different groups. 
The harm is not that the violation skews the political process, 
but that it does harm to religion. If citizen standing were ex-
tended to include all cases of governmental acts favoring reli-
gious beliefs, it is only with respect to Flast-type expenditures 
pursuant to the spending power that the individual taxpayer 
will· be the best "victim." 
The function of the double nexus test in Flast is now ap-
parent. While the citizen may claim the government has a duty 
to abide by the Constitution in all its acts, the taxpayer's 
claimed relationship to government is financial and not politi-
cal. His only tenable claim is that the government not spend 
money in a fashion which is forbidden. Since regulatory pro-
grams affect an individual directly, the Flast requirement that 
71 342 u.s. 429 (1952). 
n ld. at 434-35. 
73 The establishment clause is also intended to forbid governmental involvement 
in religion because of the threat that it poses to the integrity of that religion. 
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the challenge be made to a spending and not a regulatory pro-
gram serves the purposes of limiting standing to those cases in 
which a traditional victim cannot be found. 74 
The taxpayer's complaint is similar to that of the citizen 
in the "political injury" suit-the Constitution 'has been vio-
lated although no "victim" can be found. Neither claim in-
volves a personal stake and both allege violation of an abstract 
right. The second half of the Flast test provides the crucial 
distinction. The requirement of a specific prohibition elimi-
nates the ability of a taxpayer to sue to preserve an allocation 
of powers when others have a stronger interest in preservation. 
By tying the specific prohibition to the spending power, the 
Court avoids the "political injury" type suits which attack the 
decision-making process. Limitations on the exercise of power, 
as opposed to limitations on who can appropriately exercise it, 
are invariably protections directed at individuals and minority 
groups. Such individuals and minority groups are the only 
"victims" when such power is abused. Thus, the dual nexus 
test in Flast functions to isolate the case in which a governmen-
tal act transgresses constitutional provisions designed for the 
protection of a minority but does not impair the life, liberty, 
or property of any member of that group. In this unique situa-
tion, the constitutional provisions are more effectively guaran-
teed by granting standing to citizen-taxpayers. The filing of the 
suit by the taxpayer demonstrates his objection and thus 
places him within the group to be protected. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's decisions on citizen and taxpayer standing 
have focused on the difficulties, real or imagined, of hearing 
such suits. The opinions have not evaluated such suits as 
means to effectuate constitutional guarantees. Thus the twin 
nexus test in Flast appears to be artificial and insupportable. 
By concentrating on the interest protected by the Constitution 
and the need for minority protection, the requirement of a 
71 
"This type of legislation is the type which is least likely to injure any individual 
directly; thus it could conceivably exceed constitutional limitations and never produce 
the traditional plaintiff." Hennigan, The Essence of Standing: The Basis of a Constitu-
tional Right to Be Heard, 10 ARIZ. L. REv. 438, 449 (1968). 
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spending power claim coupled with a specific constitutional 
prohibition is intelligible. The institutions of government pro-
tect the democratic process better than citizen suits except 
when the challenged actions invade minority rights. In that 
context, the twin nexus of Flast serves to establish proper rep-
resentatives of the affected minority-the individual whose lib-
erty is invaded by the regulation, or the citizen or taxpayer if 
the only injury is financial support to religion. 
